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INTRODUCTION
Local government scholars have paid significant attention to local
“innovation” in the sphere of regulatory policy.1 And for good

* This Article was written for and presented at an early stage at the Fordham Urban

Law Journal’s Fortieth Anniversary Symposium in February 2013.
† Associate Professor, Willamette University College of Law. Thanks to Kathleen
Morris; Susan Block-Lieb; Nestor Davidson; Timothy Harrington, Deputy General
Counsel of the Boston Public Health Commission; and Jennifer Evert for comments
on drafts and helpful advice. Daniel Vall-Llobera and Joanna Fluckey provided
outstanding research assistance.
1. “Regulatory policy” as used here means governmental policy that regulates
economic, professional, or environmental behavior. See GRAEME BOUSHEY, POLICY
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reason. Many of these local innovations diffuse both horizontally, to
other cities and counties, and vertically, to the state and federal levels,
thus profoundly impacting the nation’s regulatory landscape.2 Local
government scholars have devoted less effort to analyzing the form of
these regulations,3 often presuming that local law derives from
ordinances passed by the general governing (and, usually, legislative)
body of a city or county.4 As a result, to the extent that scholarship
considers the actors involved in formulating local policy, it usually
focuses on elected officials like city councilors and mayors.5 This
Article highlights another, increasingly important source of local
regulation: administrative rulemaking. Particularly in the realm of
public health, cities have adopted many high-profile and innovative
regulatory policies by administrative rule rather than by councilenacted ordinance.6 Despite the increased importance of local

DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN AMERICA 64 n.4 (2010). For political scientists, “regulatory
policy” is a category of government action distinct from “morality” or “governance”
policy, each of which also seeks to “codify or alter behavior through regulatory
regimes.” Id. For examples of local government law scholars analyzing local policy—
including regulatory policy—innovation, see, e.g., Richard Briffault, Home Rule for
the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259–60 (2004); Paul Diller, Intrastate
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114–17 (2007) [hereinafter Diller, Intrastate];
Matthew Parlow, Progressive Policy-making on the Local Level: Rethinking
Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 375–82
(2008).
2. See Diller, Intrastate, supra note 1, at 1119–22.
3. Cf. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for
Scholars and Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788, 793 (2012) (“[N]early all policy
diffusion studies explore legislative adoption by state or national governments, while
ignoring the equally important decisions made by executive agencies.”).
4. These ordinances are sometimes called “bylaws.” The nomenclature is not
important. In cities or towns, it is usually the elected council (which may have a
different name, like board of selectmen or board of aldermen) that has the authority
to enact ordinances. At the county level, the governing legislative body is usually a
board of commissioners, but in some states has a more idiosyncratic name like
“commissioners court” or “board of chosen freeholders.” See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 18(b) (“County Commissioners Court . . . shall exercise such powers and
jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by [law] . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:20-1 (2013) (“The property, finances and affairs of every county shall be managed,
controlled and governed by . . . ‘the board of chosen freeholders’ . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., CLAYTON GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION & LOCAL
DEMOCRACY (2011) (focusing on the local legislative process); see also David
Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007) (arguing that the lack of partisan
competition in city council elections leads to “unrepresentative and uncreative”
government in big cities).
6. For convenience this Article will refer only to “cities” even when the
reference could just as easily, and correctly, include counties.
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administrative rulemaking, scant scholarship—either in local
government or administrative law—has wrestled with the doctrinal
and normative questions flowing therefrom.7
The recent litigation challenging New York City’s cap on portion
sizes of sugar-sweetened beverages—inaccurately called a “soda
ban”—has brought the issue of local administrative rulemaking to the
fore.8 Although the city’s Board of Health promulgated the portioncap rule, it was heavily promoted by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and
is therefore frequently identified with him in the popular media.9
This article uses the New York City portion-cap rule, or the
“Bloomberg soda rule,” as well as public health regulations more
generally, as a prism through which to analyze the distinctive
characteristics of the local administrative process. Part I highlights
cities’ impressive record of administrative regulation in the public
health realm, surveying key regulatory policies that exceeded the
federal and state regulatory floors in attempting to reduce tobacco
use and obesity. Part II considers the intriguing doctrinal questions
that arise when an agency of a city, which itself is an agent of the
state, makes rules with the force of law, and how these questions have
been addressed in the New York City portion-cap litigation and
elsewhere.

7. But see BERNIE BURRUS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(1963). Burrus focuses primarily on the licensing decisions of local agencies. Of
course, much scholarship has focused on zoning boards, which are often local
agencies. Generally speaking, legal commentators have not painted zoning boards in
a very flattering light. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson et al., A Study of American
Zoning Board Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB.
LAW. 689, 692–97 (2008) (explaining common institutional designs for zoning boards
in local jurisdictions); id. at 690 (noting that zoning boards are often less than neutral
and “make land use decisions based on extra-legal factors,” thus “undermining their
legitimacy”).
8. Indeed, as evidenced by recent blog postings, the portion-cap case has
prompted a handful of legal academics to ponder seriously the issue of local
administrative law. See, e.g., Rick Hills, Why Did Bloomberg’s Soda Portion Ban
Bite the Dust? Was it Mayoral Imperialism, Judicial Activism, or Both?,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 11, 2013, 8:23 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2013/03/bloombergs-soda-portion-ban-bites-the-dust-defeat-for-an-imperial-mayoror-victory-for-activist-judg.html; Ethan Leib, Local Separation of Powers?,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 15, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2013/03/local-separation-of-powers-.html;
Aaron
Saiger,
Nondelegation, now available in 32-ounce sizes, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 12, 2013,
1:28 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/03/nondelegation-nowavailable-in-32-ounce-sizes.html.
9. See infra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
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Part III then addresses the compelling normative and theoretical
questions raised by city administrative agencies’ aggressive record in
the public health sphere. Municipal regulation of the tobacco, food,
and soda industries beyond the federal and state regulatory floors
presents a challenge to the standard “public-choice” narrative of
administrative action, which suggests that agencies are likely to be
influenced, if not co-opted, by the powerful industries they are
supposed to regulate. In addition to industry opposition, some local
public health regulations, like New York City’s portion-cap rule,10
have aroused significant popular disapproval. To explain this sort of
unpopular—perhaps even elitist—rulemaking, Part III turns to
Woodrow Wilson’s writings, as a political scientist, on administrative
agencies. Wilson idealized agencies as apolitical, expert promulgators
of “scientific” regulations that would benefit the public good. In the
decades since, academics have widely lampooned Wilson’s vision as
naïve, more often viewing agency work as the product of interestgroup influence. Part III explains why recent rulemaking by local
administrative agencies strives to fit the Wilsonian mold. The Article
concludes by assessing the legal challenge and “cultural attack” on
the New York City portion-cap rule within the Wilsonian framework.
Without a general acceptance of the legitimacy of expert-driven
rulemaking, proposals like the portion-cap rule will be difficult to
sustain.
I. CITIES’ R ECORDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING IN
PUBLIC H EALTH
In the last two decades, local governments have been particularly
eager to take on significant public health problems—particularly
tobacco use and obesity.11 With respect to tobacco use, cities have led
in the enactment of clean indoor air policies,12 spearheading a
movement that eradicated second-hand smoke for tens of millions of
Americans in public spaces like stores, restaurants, and bars.13 Most
10. See infra note 30.
11. See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of
Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7–25)
[hereinafter Diller, Innovate].
12. Id. at 11–13; Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The
Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825,
829 (2006) (noting that more than 1600 local governments had passed laws in the area
of clean indoor air policy).
13. See Comprehensive Smoke-Free Laws, 50 Largest U.S. Cities—2000 and
2012, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 914 (2012) (concluding that among
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of these regulations were enacted by ordinance, but in some
instances, local health agencies promulgated administrative rules
mandating smoke-free environments.14 For example, the Boston
public health authority and a number of other, smaller Massachusetts
municipalities prohibited smoking in indoor public places by
administrative rule, a practice sanctioned by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in 2001.15 In West Virginia and Michigan,
county public health agencies expanded the scope of the state’s
smoke-free workplace law to cover all indoor public places, which
their respective state high courts upheld.16 In other jurisdictions,
however, local health agencies either doubted their own authority to
regulate indoor smoking,17 or had their regulations invalidated by the
courts.18 As secondhand smoke regulation continues to evolve—
covering additional places like parks, residential buildings, and

the fifty largest cities in the United States, the number that were covered by
comprehensive smoke-free laws increased from one in 2000 to thirty in 2012).
14. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at tbl. 2 (surveying smoke-free workplace
policies of the top twenty-five cities by population and finding that of thirteen
adopted, eleven were by ordinance, one by voter initiative, and one by administrative
regulation).
15. See Tri-Nel Mgmt., v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37 (2001)
(upholding the Barnstable health board’s “absolute” prohibition on smoking in bars
and restaurants); Clean Air Works Workplace Smoking Restrictions, Bos. Pub.
Health Comm’n [hereinafter BPHC], (Dec. 9, 2002) (restricting smoking in enclosed
workplaces).
16. See McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 2009) (upholding
multi-county public health agency rule); Found. for Indep. Living v. CabellHuntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d 744 (W. Va. 2003) (upholding county-city
public health agencies’ clean indoor air regulations).
17. See Sandi Doughton, Pierce County Adopts Sweeping Ban on Smoking; Legal
Fight Ahead, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2001807047_smokeban040.html (noting that King County considered a smoking ban
but “backed off after lawyers concluded [it] lacked the authority” to adopt one).
18. See, e.g., Dutchess/Putnam Rest. Ass’n, v. Putnam Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 178
F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (invalidating county health agency rule restricting
smoking in public places); Leonard v. Dutchess Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 105 F. Supp.
2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Health,
773 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 2002) (holding that local health board lacked the authority to
prohibit smoking in all indoor public spaces); Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Pierce
Cnty. Health Dep’t, 105 P.3d 985 (Wash. 2005) (invalidating indoor smoking ban
promulgated by county health board because it conflicted with state law).
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outdoor areas19—some local health agencies continue to be at the
vanguard of regulation.20
In addition to smoking bans, local health agencies have sought to
clamp down on tobacco use through other regulatory methods. When
numerous cities banned outdoor tobacco advertising in the 1990s,
mostly by ordinance, others addressed the issue by health agency
rule.21 More recently, Boston and numerous other Massachusetts
municipalities banned the sale of cigarettes in pharmacies through
rules issued by their boards of health, and Boston’s board of health
also banned the sale of cigar wraps.22 In 2009, New York City’s Board
of Health issued a rule requiring retailers selling cigarettes to display
graphic warning posters near the area of sale.23 Each of these rules
sought to tighten the regulatory regime applicable to the tobacco
industry and its affiliates within a particular jurisdiction.
With respect to combating obesity, evidence from big cities shows
that food retail regulations have been implemented by administrative
rule more frequently than tobacco restrictions.24 New York City’s
Board has been particularly aggressive in the last decade. It was the
first governmental entity in the United States to ban the use of
artificial trans fats in restaurant foods,25 and the first to require menu
labels at franchise restaurants to post calorie counts on menu
boards.26 Soon after New York City’s action, many other cities and
counties adopted similar regulations, with some doing so by

19. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing such “third-generation”
smoke-free regulations).
20. See, e.g., Clean Air Works Workplace Smoking Restrictions, BPHC (Dec. 11,
2008) (extending workplace smoking ban to include adjacent outdoor areas like
patios).
21. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that of the top twenty-five
cities in population, nine adopted outdoor advertising restrictions by ordinance, while
one—Seattle—lay within a jurisdiction whose city-county health authority adopted
restrictions by administrative rule).
22. See Local Legislative Efforts by State, TOBACCOFREERX.COM, http://www.
tobaccofreerx.com/local_efforts.html (follow “Local Efforts” hyperlink) (listing
restrictions adopted by Massachusetts municipalities); Regulation Restricting the
Sale of Tobacco Products in the City of Boston, BPHC (Dec. 11, 2008).
23. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 181.19 (2012). The Second Circuit ruled that the New
York City Board’s rule was preempted by federal law. See 23-34 94th St. Grocery
Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2012).
24. Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 61.
25. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2012).
26. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120–21 (2d
Cir. 2009) (discussing the original N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.50, adopted in 2006,
and subsequent changes thereto).
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administrative rule rather than by local ordinance. As in the tobacco
context, Boston and other Massachusetts municipalities banned trans
fats administratively rather than by ordinance.27 Other notable
jurisdictions include King County, Washington, whose Board of
Health adopted both menu labeling and trans fat regulations by
administrative rule,28 and Nashville-Davidson County, whose Board
of Health adopted a menu labeling rule that was later preempted by
the state legislature.29
Perhaps the highest-profile obesity prevention policy adopted by
an administrative agency is New York City’s portion-cap rule, which
was supposed to take effect in March 2013, but is currently stayed by
court order.30 Aimed at reducing the consumption of sugary drinks
like soda in order to prevent obesity and other health problems, the
rule would have capped the size of containers in which sugary
beverages could be served in certain retail settings.31 No other
jurisdiction has yet adopted a similar rule, but others expressed
interest before the litigation achieved its success to date.32
27. See A Regulation to Restrict Foods Containing Artificial Trans Fats in the
City of Boston, BPHC (Mar. 13, 2008); see also, e.g., Katheleen Conti, Bans on Trans
Fats Coming in New Year, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/
local/articles/2011/11/06/lynn_bans_trans_fats_chelsea_could_be_next/
(describing
efforts of Lynn and Chelsea boards of health to ban trans fats); NEEDHAM HEALTH
DEP’T, TOWN OF NEEDHAM TRANS FAT BAN, (2009), available at
http://www.needhamma.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2422
(noting
that
Needham town board of health promulgated trans fat ban in March 2009); Trans Fat
Policy, CAMBRIDGE PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, http://www.cambridgepublichealth.org/
policy-practice/trans_fat_policy/index.php (last updated Sept. 2010) (noting that the
Cambridge health department adopted a rule banning trans fats in July 2008). But
see David Abel & John M. Guilfoil, Brookline OKs Trans Fat Ban, BOS. GLOBE,
June 1, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/06/01/brookline_oks_
trans_fat_ban/ (recounting Brookline’s adoption of trans fat ban by town meeting).
28. KING COUNTY, WASH., BD. OF HEALTH CODE § 5.10.016 (2013) (menu
labeling); id. § 5.10.035 (restricting artificial trans fats).
29. 2010 Tenn. Pub. Acts 614 (overriding Nashville rule) (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-14-303 (2013)); Jenny Upchurch, Nashville Restaurants Ordered to Post
Calories, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 6, 2009 (noting that the city-county health department
issued the rule).
30. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2013), enforcement stayed by N.Y. Statewide
Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970
N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
31. See N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.53.
32. See Leon Stafford, Soda Wars: Cities Seek Restrictions, Taxes to Curb
Obesity, ATL. J.-CONST. (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:38 AM), http://www.ajc.com/
news/news/local/soda-wars-cities-seek-restrictions-taxes-to-curb-o/nS4b2/
(noting
that officials in Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass., were considering emulating
New York City’s portion-cap rule).
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In a variety of instances, action first taken at the local level by an
administrative agency has diffused “horizontally” to other
jurisdictions, many (if not most) of which adopt the policy by
ordinance rather than by administrative rule. For instance, although
New York City first adopted menu labeling as a Board-promulgated
rule, a number of other cities and counties later adopted the same or
similar regulation by council enactment.33 Why some cities are more
likely to use the administrative process rather than the ordinanceenacting process is a complicated question, and it is beyond this
Article’s scope to propose a complete answer. Legal doctrine,
geographic jurisdiction, and institutional design play major roles, and
this Article will explore these issues in some detail. Funding, staffing,
institutional culture, and local political culture are also relevant.
Public health scholars have studied local agency effectiveness in
considerable depth, sometimes considering at least some of the above
factors, but most studies focus on service provision or overall
effectiveness rather than the use of regulatory authority specifically.34
In addition to their role in stimulating horizontal policy diffusion,
local administrative agencies can stimulate vertical policy migration.
This process occurs when a state legislature or Congress passes laws
that mimic or borrow from the local regulations, or when higher-level
administrative agencies promulgate their own rules emulating local
agency rules. Often, the migration process is a combination of both.
For instance, after local-level adoption of menu labeling, at least five
states passed menu labeling statutes between 2008 and 2010,35 while

33. See COLLEEN IP INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, STATE AND LOCAL MENU
NUTRITION LABELING LEGISLATION SUMMARY (AUGUST 2011) (2011), available at
http://www.collenip.com/services/FINAL_Menu_Labeling_Laws_Chart.pdf (listing
seven local jurisdictions that adopted menu labeling regulations by ordinance,
including Suffolk County, N.Y., which adopted an ordinance specifically delegating
authority to its health board to promulgate rules on the matter).
34. E.g., Zhuo (Adam) Chen et al., Obesity Prevention: The Impact of Local
Health Departments, 48 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 603 (2013); Sandy J. Slater et al.,

Missed Opportunities: Local Health Departments as Providers of Obesity Prevention
Programs for Adolescents, 33 AM. J. PREV. MED. S246, S247 (2007) (including
“enacting new health regulations” as “advocacy activities” studied, but not focusing
on them); Xinzhi Zhang et al., Obesity Prevention and Diabetes Screening at Local
Health Departments, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1434 (2010). But see Jennifer L.
Pomeranz, The Unique Authority of State and Local Health Departments to
Address Obesity, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1192, 1193 (2011) (“Approximately half of
the public health departments in the country can promulgate regulations; however,
only approximately 17% report enacting regulations as a primary activity.”).
35. These states were California, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont. See
Trans Fat and Menu Labeling Legislation, Nat’l Conf. of State Legs.,
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one state—Massachusetts—adopted a menu labeling regime by
administrative regulation.36 In 2010, Congress included a menu
labeling provision as part of the Affordable Care Act, although
implementing regulations are still pending from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).37
As the menu labeling example
demonstrates, administrative action by one or more local
governments can constitute the crucial first step in the policy diffusion
process; without such administrative action, certain policies might
never make it to higher levels of government.38 The administrative
action on the tobacco and obesity fronts is also remarkable because in
each context, the local administrative agency is regulating to the
detriment of politically powerful industries and their allies for the
purpose of conferring diffuse benefits on the public, thus challenging
the standard public-choice account of agency action, as discussed in
Part III.
II. LOCAL AGENCIES’ UNIQUE D OCTRINAL FOOTING
Per foundational federal constitutional doctrine, local governments
are “convenient agencies,” or “creatures” of the state.39 If they serve
city and county governments, therefore, local public health
authorities might be seen as agencies of the state’s agencies, or agents
“twice removed” from state control. If, on the other hand, local
public health agencies are seen as created directly by state law,
independent of the local governments to which they are linked, then
they are theoretically equivalent to local governments themselves, or
to state agencies. The theoretical conception of local agencies can
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/trans-fat-and-menu-labeling-legislation.
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
36. See 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 590.009(G) (2013); see also Jason Szep,
Massachusetts Sets Tough Fast-food Menu Rules, REUTERS (May 13, 2009),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/05/13/food-massachusetts-idUKN13413157200
90513 (describing Massachusetts’s menu-labeling rules as toughest in the United
States because they applied to menu labels on drive-through boards as well).
37. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573-77 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(q)(5) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
38. See Diller, Intrastate, supra note 1, at 1129 (citing Roderick M. Hills, Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007)). But see Shipan & Volden, supra note 12, at 827, 840
(finding evidence to support the proposition that, in states with low levels of
legislative professionalism, local enactment of a policy can release pressure on the
state legislature to adopt a similar policy).
39. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); cf. Washington v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982) (describing local school boards as
“creatures of the state”).
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have practical implications. If local agencies are city sub-agents, then
they should be subject to direct city control much like state and
federal administrative agencies are (usually) subject to control by the
legislatures that created them and whose laws they “enforce.”40
Moreover, if local agencies are city creatures, then their powers
should be as great as—and no greater than—the power of the cities
they serve. By contrast, if agencies are direct creatures of the state,
the extent of their powers should be circumscribed by state law only.
As the ensuing discussion shows, there is some variation in how states
frame the powers of local agencies.
A. State or Local Source of Power
Most state courts that have analyzed the scope of local health
agency powers have looked primarily, if not exclusively, to state law.
For instance, in Massachusetts, the courts routinely cite the state
delegation statute, which simply declares that “[b]oards of health may
make reasonable health regulations,” as the font of broad authority
for local regulations.41 Relying on this provision, Massachusetts
courts have upheld a variety of local health agency rules regulating
smoking or tobacco distribution more strictly than state law.42 In
doing so, the courts have not concerned themselves with the extent of
the city’s powers, despite the fact that local charters also address local
health agencies and some charters reserve the right to abolish the
agencies and appoint their officers.43 Massachusetts municipalities

40. Some agencies at the federal level are designed to have more institutional
independence from the executive, see generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 769 (2013) (reviewing and analyzing the distinction between “independent” and
“executive” agencies), but Congress retains the authority to legislatively override a
rule promulgated by even an independent agency.
41. See, e.g., Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 41
(Mass. 2001) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31).
42. E.g., Am. Lithuanian Naturalization Club, Athol, Mass. v. Bd. of Health of
Athol, 844 N.E.2d 231, 238 (Mass. 2005) (upholding regulation prohibiting smoking
in enclosed areas of membership associations); Loyal Order of Moose, Inc.,
Yarmouth Lodge # 2270 v. Bd. of Health of Yarmouth, 790 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Mass.
2003) (upholding regulation prohibiting smoking “in all food service establishments,
lounges, and bars”); Tri-Nel Mgmt. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 41
(Mass. 2001) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31) (upholding Barnstable
regulation that prohibited indoor smoking); RYO Cigar Ass’n v. Bos. Pub. Health
Comm’n, 950 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding BPHC’s ban on the sale
of cigar wraps).
43. E.g., CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, MASS. §§ 2-4 & 5-1, available
at http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/TownManager/charter_current.pdf.
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enjoy reasonably broad home rule, at least with respect to regulatory
matters, so the issue of authority has remained academic because
none of the litigated cases involved an expressed disagreement
between an elected governing body of a locality and its board of
health.44 In Boston and Cambridge, as explained below, state law
expressly delegates power directly to public health agencies that are
largely independent of those cities.45
The Washington state courts have also looked to state law as the
source of local health agency powers, and, in doing so, purport to
uphold local rules so long as they do not conflict with state law. For
instance, in considering a challenge to the Tacoma-Pierce County
Health Department’s ban on smoking in all public accommodations
in the county (a rule that went beyond the strictures of state law at
the time) the court noted that the Department’s authority derived
“solely from statutory delegation.”46 Although the specific statutory
delegation in question was quite broad, allowing health boards to
enact “rules and regulations as are necessary in order to preserve,
promote and improve the public health,”47 the court found the local
antismoking rule invalid because it conflicted with state law on the
matter.48 In applying standard “conflict” or “preemption” analysis,49
the court ostensibly treated the agency rule like an ordinance enacted
by a city or county legislative body. In discussing the agency’s
powers, however, the court noted that “[a] statutory delegation to an
agency . . . is limited to those powers expressly granted, and if any
doubt exists related to the granting of the power, it must be denied.”50

44. For more on Massachusetts home rule, including its application of the
“private law exception,” see Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action,
64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1127 & n.90 (2012).
45. See infra notes 109–18 and accompanying text.
46. Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Pierce Cnty. Health Dep’t, 105 P.3d 985, 987
(Wash. 2005).
47. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 70.05.060(3)). The court also cited a state law
provision that directs a local health board to “[p]rovide for the control and
prevention of any dangerous, contagious or infectious disease within the jurisdiction
of the local health department.” Id. at 987 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 70.05.060(4)).
48. Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 988.
49. In some states, “conflict” is a subcategory of preemption, whereas in others, it
is a separate category of analysis altogether. Diller, Intrastate, supra note 1, at 1141
n.129.
50. Entm’t Indus. Coal., 105 P.3d at 988.
Interestingly, in making this
observation, the court cited a case involving the city of Seattle, Employco Personnel
Serv. v. City of Seattle, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991), indicating that Dillon’s Rule remains
applicable to Washington municipalities to some extent despite the common
understanding that Washington is a home-rule state. See, e.g., Ryan M. Carson, Note,
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Did this Dillon’s Rule-like approach to the agency’s powers affect the
case’s outcome?51 Likely not, but in another case from a year earlier,

Parkland Light & Water Co. v. Tacoma-Pierce County Board of
Health, three dissenting justices hinted that county home-rule should
have affected the analysis of a challenged agency rule.52
In Parkland, water districts within the geographic boundaries of the
city-county health board challenged the board’s authority to require
them to fluoridate their water.53 A bare majority of the court found
that the local rule (adopted as a binding “resolution”) “irreconcilably
conflict[ed]” with a state law on the matter that established a
procedure by which water districts could decide whether to
fluoridate.54 The dissent, however, believed that the state law merely
established one procedure for fluoridation that a county health board
was free to supersede, and, therefore, there was no conflict between
the agency’s resolution and the state law.55 In voting to uphold the
health board’s powers, the dissent expressly noted the home-rule
powers of the county the board served.56 While both the majority and
the dissent purported to engage in run-of-the-mill preemption
analysis, for the dissent, county home rule may have been a “plus
factor” tipping the scales in favor of the validity of the board’s rule.
If Washington shows the potential dangers to local health agencies’
authority when viewed as purely creatures of the state, Michigan and
West Virginia demonstrate the opposite: agencies’ perceived
independence of the counties they serve may result in enhanced, or at
least more secure, powers. For instance, Michigan counties do not
enjoy “home rule” in the standard sense of the word.57 Yet when a
Chinks in the Armor: Municipal Authority to Enact Shoreline Permit Moratoria
After Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 184 (2007)
(referring to Washington’s “home-rule doctrine”).
51. Accord 1 JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9b, at
93 (2d ed. New York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1873); see also id. § 55, at 173.
52. 90 P.3d 37, 40–42 (Wash. 2004).
53. Id. at 38.
54. Id. at 40.
55. Id. at 40–42 (Ireland, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 41 (“The Board’s police powers arise from a statutory delegation by the
legislature. Pierce County is a home rule charter county.”).
57. See Mudge v. Macomb Cnty., 534 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (“A
county, as a political subdivision of the state, possesses only those powers delegated
to it by constitution or statute.”) (citing Wright v. Bartz, 62 N.W.2d 458 (Mich.
1954)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 580 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1998); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 45.3 (2013) (“Each organized county shall be a body politic and
corporate, for the following purposes, that is to say: To sue and be sued, to purchase
and hold real and personal estate for the use of the county; to borrow money for the
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multi-county public health agency promulgated a smoke-free rule that
went further than Michigan’s statewide law at the time, the Michigan
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the agency’s authority to so
regulate.58 Citing to the Michigan statutory provisions that delegated
the power to “[a]dopt regulations to property safeguard the public
health” to local health authorities,59 the court concluded that these
provisions justified the Northwest Michigan Community Health
Agency’s (NMCHA) smoke-free workplace rule.60 Under the state’s
statutory scheme for local health agencies, the elected governing body
(county commission) of each member county of the NMCHA had to
approve, and did in fact approve, the proposed rule.61 (Indeed, under
this scheme, the possibility of “conflict” between the agency and any
constituent county was nonexistent; one dissenting county out of four,
even if the least populous, could have vetoed the NMCHA’s rule.)
The county commissioners were thus able to give final approval to a
health agency rule that each commission may have had dubious
authority to enact on its own.62
In West Virginia, the disparity between county power and county
health agency power is even more pronounced. West Virginia has
relatively weak home rule for cities, and counties possess even less

purpose of erecting and repairing county buildings, and for the building of bridges, to
make all necessary contracts, and to do all other necessary acts in relation to the
property and concerns of the county.”). The Michigan Constitution allows counties
to adopt their own charters, but doing so does not confer any additional powers on
counties; rather, the adoption of a charter primarily allows the county to reorganize
its leadership structure. MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
58. See McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 2009).
59. Id. at 23 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2435(d)); see also McNeil, 772
N.W.2d at 38 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2441(1) (granting health agencies the
power to adopt regulations “that are necessary or appropriate to implement or carry
out the duties or functions vested by law in the local health department”)).
60. The NMHCA consists of Antrim, Charlevoix, Emmet, and Otsego counties.
McNeil, 772 N.W.2d at 20. Justice Markman and the two other dissenters agreed
with the majority’s conclusion that the NMCHA had the authority to ban smoking in
settings not then covered by state law, see id. at 36 (Markman, J., dissenting) (“I
concur with the majority’s conclusion that . . . the NMCHA possessed the authority
to adopt that part of the clean indoor air regulation that restricts smoking . . . .”), but
disagreed regarding whether the agency could use a particular enforcement
mechanism, id.
61. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2441; see also McNeil, 772 N.W.2d at 21.
62. Whether county commissions had the power to enact smoking regulations
beyond the strictures of state law has not been litigated. At least four counties
passed ordinances that did so and none, apparently, were challenged in court. See
Wayne Bans Smoking at Work, DET. NEWS, Mar. 18, 2005, at E1.
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authority.63 Nonetheless, the state supreme court has upheld the
authority of local health agencies, which are organized at the county
or joint county-city level, to promulgate indoor air restrictions that
are stricter than those imposed by state law.64 In doing so, the court
has cited the state legislature’s “broad delegation of power” to local
boards to make rules for “the promoting and maintaining of clean
and safe air.”65 Perhaps because they enjoy substantial power, local
boards of health have been more aggressive in regulating indoor
smoking in West Virginia than elected local entities.66 Like Michigan,
local elected bodies in West Virginia have the power to block the
implementation of county rules, and at least a handful have done so.67
But if county commissioners have the authority to initiate smoke-free
laws, which is questionable under West Virginia home-rule doctrine,
it appears that they prefer to let health departments move first.68
In other states, courts have interpreted health boards’ powers
narrowly in finding agency action unauthorized, or the state
legislature has specifically withdrawn power from local agencies. For
instance, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the Toledo-Lucas
County Board of Health lacked the authority to promulgate a rule
banning smoking in all public places in the county.69 Despite a state
statute seemingly granting local boards wide-ranging authority to
“make such orders and regulations as are necessary for public
health,”70 the court held that boards are not vested with “unlimited
63. Kenneth A. Klase, West Virginia, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA 446, 451 (Dale
Krane et al. eds., 2001) (describing municipal home rule in West Virginia as very
limited and observing that counties have even less authority than the “token home
rule” afforded to cities).
64. E.g., Found. for Indep. Living v. Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d
744 (W. Va. 2003).
65. Id. at 751 (citing W. VA. CODE R. § 16-2-11(a)(1)(ii)).
66. See id. at 750 n.3 (noting that the local health boards covering forty-six of the
state’s fifty-five counties have adopted clean indoor air regulations).
67. See, e.g., Clark Davis, Cabell Set to Implement Smoking Plan, W. VA. PUB.
BROADCASTING (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=13049
(noting that in Berkeley and Marion Counties the elected commissioners blocked the
health departments’ implementation of proposed antismoking regulations).
68. Indeed, at least one city has waited for the health department to act before
implementing its own clean indoor air ordinance. See Stacy Moniot, Monongalia
County Approves Smoking Ban, 12 WBOY.COM (Jan. 23, 2012 3:42 PM),
http://www.wboy.com/story/16481526/2012/01/09/monongalia-county-approvessmoking-ban (explaining how Morgantown deferred implementation of its city
ordinance pending county health department’s promulgation of a rule).
69. D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo Lucas Cnty. Bd. of Health, 773 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio
2002).
70. Id. at 547 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 3709.21).
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authority to adopt regulations addressing all public-health
concerns.”71 Although the court recognized that “local boards of
health are better situated than the General Assembly to protect the
public health,” it believed that a smoking ban went too far, repeatedly
invoking the notion that boards cannot act in “any area of public
health,” without explaining which areas they may regulate without
further legislative delegation.72
Courts in New Jersey and North Carolina also found local health
board efforts to regulate smoking invalid, albeit for more
idiosyncratic reasons. In New Jersey, one trial court held that a
regional health commission lacked the power to ban smoking in
indoor public places because the state had preempted the power to
ban smoking unless justified as a fire safety measure; while
municipalities may have had the authority to enact fire safety
measures, unelected health boards did not.73 In North Carolina, the
state appellate court relied heavily on a couple of New York state
administrative law cases (including Boreali v. Axelrod, which has
been featured prominently in the New York City portion-cap
litigation74) to hold that a county health agency smoking ban
amounted to an exercise of legislative, rather than administrative,
power.75 Finally, in Tennessee, the state legislature responded to the
Nashville-Davidson County health department’s attempt to require
that calorie counts be posted on menu labels by specifically
withdrawing the power of any “non-elected” local entity (i.e., an
appointed board of health) to issue such rules.76
In all of the above instances, state law was the driving force in
determining whether a local health agency’s action was within the
scope of its authority. In the New York City portion-cap case, local
law has assumed a more prominent role. The plaintiffs challenging
the portion-cap rule argue that the Board of Health exceeded its

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. LDM, Inc. v. Princeton Reg’l Health Comm’n, 764 A.2d 507, 523–24, 530 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
74. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987). For a discussion of Boreali
and its role in the portion-cap litigation, see infra notes 82–95 and accompanying text.
75. City of Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 478 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
The court never actually decided whether the state had delegated the power to
regulate smoking to a local health board; even if the state had so delegated, the court
would have held the board’s rule unconstitutional because the board took nonhealth-related criteria into account when fashioning the rule. Id. at 535.
76. See supra note 29.

DILLER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1874

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

11/12/2013 11:14 PM

[Vol. XL

delegated authority in promulgating the rule.77 They stress that the
Board’s powers emanate from—and are circumscribed by—the city
charter and any ensuing delegations, or lack thereof, from the city
council.78 The City, by contrast, has sought to premise the Board’s
powers more on state law than on local law, arguing that the Board
exercises “plenary powers of legislation” delegated directly by the
state legislature.79 In its recent decision, New York Statewide

Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City
Department of Health,80 the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court invalidated the rule, largely accepting the plaintiffs’
invitation to focus on the city council, rather than the state legislature,
as the font of the Board’s powers.81
Looming over the Appellate Division’s analysis in New York
Statewide Coalition was the peculiar New York Court of Appeals
precedent of Boreali v. Axelrod.82 In Boreali, the Court of Appeals
invalidated an attempt by the Public Health Council, a state
administrative agency, to impose smoke-free regulations that were
more stringent than those imposed by state legislation.83
In
invalidating the restrictions, the court held that, despite the Council’s
seemingly broad delegated powers to “deal [with] any matter
affecting the public health,”84 the “coalescence” of various
“circumstances” pushed the Council’s action to the wrong side of the
“difficult-to-define” line between “administrative rulemaking and
legislative policymaking.”85 One such “circumstance” was that the
state legislature had tried and failed repeatedly to pass more stringent
77. See generally Brief of Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Respondents at 17–23, N.Y.
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 24, 2013) (No.
653584/12).
78. Id. at *5.
79. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 17–18, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y.
Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 24, 2013) (No. 653584/12) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
80. 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
81. Id. at 206 (“The Board of Health . . . derives its power . . . directly and solely
from . . . the City Council.”). But see id. at 211 (also discussing “the laws of the state,”
including “the City Charter’s Enabling Act”).
82. Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987); see also N.Y. Statewide
Coal., 2013 WL 3880139, at *3 (noting that the “landmark decision in Boreali” is “the
starting point for the analysis”).
83. 517 N.E.2d at 1351–52.
84. Id. at 1353 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(a)).
85. Id. at 1355.
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smoking regulations.86 This record indicated to the court that the
Council’s rule went beyond normal “interstitial” rulemaking and
intruded on “legislative policy-making.”87
In articulating the
distinction between these two supposedly separate categories, the
Boreali majority notably relied on nondelegation principles that have
been largely disavowed at the federal level, thus making New York
state a particularly inviting jurisdiction in which to challenge agency
action.
Subsequent court opinions have applied Boreali to local
administrative agencies in New York.88 Like state agencies, therefore,
local agencies in New York are constrained by an unusually robust
nondelegation canon. In the portion-cap rule case, the Appellate
Division read the city charter with Boreali in mind, interpreting
narrowly the city charter’s grant of authority to the Board to regulate
“all matters affecting health in the city of New York.”89 In spite of
this seemingly broad language, the Appellate Division limited the
Board’s authority to protecting the public from “inherently harmful
matters” like diseases and unsafe food.90 Ironically, the court did not
consider the notion that obesity might be a disease.91
Notwithstanding myriad evidence linking soda consumption to
obesity and other health ills, the court ruled that the Board could not
regulate soda because it is not a “health hazard per se,” but is only
dangerous when consumed excessively.92 The Appellate Division’s
constricted view of the Board’s authority was in significant tension
with the Board’s record of promulgating other rules to fight obesity,

86. Id. at 1352 (citing “some 40 bills”); id. at 1356 (“[T]he agency acted in an area
in which the Legislature had repeatedly tried—and failed—to reach agreement in the
face of substantial public debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested
factions.”).
87. Id. at 1355–56.
88. See, e.g., Dutchess/Putnam Rest. & Tavern Ass’n v. Putnam Cnty. Dep’t of
Health, 178 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (invalidating county health board
regulation restricting indoor smoking in public places on the basis of Boreali);
Leonard v. Dutchess Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 105 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(same); Justiana v. Niagara Cnty. Dep’t of Public Health, 45 F. Supp. 2d 236
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass’n v. Cnty. of Nassau, 965
F. Supp. 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).
89. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 556.
90. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
91. See Andrew Pollack, A.M.A. Recognizes Obesity as a Disease, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2013, at B1.
92. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
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like requiring calorie counts on menu boards and banning trans fats,
which had not been challenged in court on administrative grounds.93
Another curious element of Boreali’s reasoning that the Appellate
Division relied on in invalidating the portion-cap rule was the record
of legislative inaction in regulating sugar-sweetened drinks. In
applying this Boreali “factor,” the court focused on not just the state
legislature’s failed attempts to regulate soda more stringently, but
also the New York City Council’s.94 The Boreali court’s reliance on
legislative inaction as evidence of administrative overreach is a
dubious approach, inviting opponents of a regulation to introduce
legislation doomed to fail to bolster legal attacks on the regulation’s
validity.95 For this reason, the New York Court of Appeals has
backed away from this aspect of Boreali’s reasoning in other cases.96
Regardless, applying this prong of Boreali, as the Appellate Division
did, at the local level puts city boards of health at a graver
disadvantage. Their authority may be constricted by failed legislation
at both the state and local levels.
The City has appealed the Appellate Division’s ruling to New
York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals.97 The court’s assessment
of the portion-cap rule’s validity will depend in large part on whether
the court re-affirms Boreali’s peculiar reasoning regarding separation
of powers under the state constitution. To be sure, a state is not
compelled to follow federal jurisprudence in interpreting its own

93. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. The New York City Council
adopted the Board’s trans fat rule as legislation post hoc, thus shielding it from a
legal challenge similar to the one brought against the portion-cap rule. See New York
City, N.Y., Int. No. 0517-2007 (codified at NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 17192 (2013)).
94. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 971 N.Y.S.2d at 212 (“[B]oth the City and State
legislatures have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to target sugar sweetened
beverages.”).
95. Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1359 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s approach to legislative inaction “will be welcomed by opponents of all
kinds of existing laws” who argue for constricted agency authority).
96. See, e.g., Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171 (N.Y. 1995) (rejecting the
argument that an executive order is invalid because it is “substantially similar” to a
bill that failed in the legislature); Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y.C. v. Higgins, 630
N.E.2d 626, 631–32 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting relevance of twenty-seven failed attempts
to amend a statute in deciding whether an agency’s similar interpretation of the
statute was correct).
97. Chris Dolmetsch, N.Y. City Asks Top State Court to Review Large-Soda Ban,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-05/n-ycity-asks-top-state-court-to-review-large-soda-ban.html.
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constitution,98 but the Boreali majority relied on numerous federal
sources in articulating the nondelegation principle supposedly
embodied in the New York State Constitution.99 In doing so, the
Boreali majority mistakenly considered the federal nondelegation
doctrine alive and well even though it had been effectively interred
for years.100 If the Court of Appeals were to deem the portion-cap
rule within the Board’s delegated power, and not unlawful
“legislation” per Boreali, the City must still defend the rule against
the claim, accepted by the trial court but not specifically addressed by
the Appellate Division, that the rule is an “arbitrary and capricious”
exercise of administrative power.101 Part III discusses this attack on
the rule in more depth.
B. Institutional Design
Most courts treat the question of whence does local health agency
authority emanate, discussed above, as distinct from the issue of how
an agency’s officials are chosen. As Part III will explain, however, the
method of choosing agency officials, and whether such officials have
relevant professional expertise, are integrally related to the Wilsonian
argument for the legitimacy of agency rulemaking. State law usually
provides at least the skeletal outline of how a health agency’s board
should be constituted. Many, if not most, states require the
appointment of local health board members, although some states
allow for them to be popularly elected, or allow an already-elected
legislative body to also serve as a board of health.
Before proceeding, a quick terminology note is in order. Many
states have local “departments” of health that also contain a “board”
of health. Usually, the “board” is the governing body of the
“department,” with the authority to adopt rules that department
officials execute. Sometimes, the executive head of the department is
also a member of the governing board. For this reason, lawsuits

98. See Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vivé
La Difference, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005).
99. E.g., Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1353, 1355–56 (citing TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, a treatise on the federal constitution).
100. See Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1360 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority’s “reliance on the anachronistic nondelegation theory” that has “in the
main” been “subsequently overruled”).
101. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health and Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
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challenging a “board”-adopted rule often name the “department” as
a defendant as well.102
In jurisdictions where health board members are appointed, the
applicable law often requires that board members possess work
experience or educational credentials evidencing expertise in the
field. Whether and to what extent appointments made by executive
officials are subject to legislative confirmation varies. A full survey of
health agencies’ design is beyond the scope of this article; the
discussion below focuses on the selection and appointment
mechanisms for the agencies in three jurisdictions with prominent
records of public health innovation—namely, Massachusetts (focused
on the health boards of Boston and towns), Washington (focused on
King County-Seattle), and New York City.

1. Massachusetts: Towns and Boston
Due to the variety of forms of local government in Massachusetts
(cities, towns, villages, etc.), state law prescribes different methods of
constituting boards of health.103 I focus here on towns and the city of
Boston since the boards of health of each have promulgated
noteworthy regulations restricting the use and availability of
tobacco.104 With respect to towns, judicial decisions have upheld the
authority of health boards in Athol, Barnstable, and Yarmouth,
specifically, to regulate smoking.105 Massachusetts law prescribes that
town boards of health be composed of three or more persons either
appointed by the board of selectmen (the general governing body of
the town) or elected directly by the town’s voters, “unless other
provision is made by law or vote of the town.”106 In some instances,
the board of selectmen themselves can serve as the board of health.107
State law does not require any specific expertise of town health board
members. In practice, Barnstable and Yarmouth have three- and
five-member boards of health, respectively, appointed by the board of

102. See, e.g., Dutchess/Putnam Rest. & Tavern Ass’n v. Putnam Cnty. Dep’t of
Health, 178 F. Supp. 2d 396, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (naming both the Putnam County
Department of Health and the Putnam County Board of Health as defendants while
the court’s opinion primarily discusses the “Board”).
103. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 26, 26A-D (cities); §§ 27A, 27B (regional or
joint boards of health) (2013); id. ch. 41 §§ 1, 1A (towns).
104. See supra notes 15, 22 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 42.
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, §§ 1, 1A.
107. Id. § 21.
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selectmen, while Athol has a three-member board appointed by the
city manager.108
The Boston Public Health Commission is a different creature
altogether, created by a special act of the Massachusetts legislature in
1995 as an independent agency, constituting its own political
subdivision.109 The BPHC replaced the former Boston Department of
Health and Hospitals.110 State law provides for a governing board
(referred to as “the Board of Health”) of seven members, with six
appointed by the mayor of Boston subject to city council approval;
the seventh member is the chief executive officer of the private,
nonprofit Boston Medical Center, who serves ex officio.111 Of the six
mayoral appointees, two must be trustees of neighborhood health
centers affiliated with the Medical Center, and one must be selected
from a list of nominees proposed by “representatives of organized
labor” appointed by the mayor.112 The three board seats that do not
require any particular affiliation are currently filled by a physician, a
medical doctor who is also a director of a hospital center and a
professor at Harvard Medical School, and an associate dean at
Boston University’s school of public health.113 All members of the
commission serve staggered three-year terms, and may be removed

108. ATHOL, MASS., TOWN CHARTER § 5-3-9(j) (2007), available at
http://www.athol-ma.gov/egov/docs/1228756223_273803.pdf (noting that the town
manager has the power to appoint three members of the board of health, one of
whom must be a “professional health practitioner”); BARNSTABLE, MASS., TOWN
CHARTER § 10-7(k)(3) (2004) (noting that the board of selectmen appoints members
of board of health), available at http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/TownClerk/
TownCode.pdf; Board of Health, TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, http://www.town.
barnstable.ma.us/BoardOfHealth (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (listing three members
of board); Board of Health, YARMOUTH, MASS., http://www.yarmouth.ma.us/
index.aspx?NID=474 (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (listing five members of board).
109. See 1995 MASS. ACTS ch. 147 § 3(a) (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app.
§§ 2-1 to 2-15 (2013)).
110. Id. § 2-1(a).
111. Id. § 2-3(b). The BPHC’s composition was to some extent contingent on the
approval of a merger between Boston City Hospital and Boston University Medical
Center, which ultimately occurred and was another major focus of the 1995 Act. See
id. § 2-5; Our History, BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N, http://www.bphc.org/
about/bphchistory/Pages/Home.aspx (noting that in 1996, the BPHC “was formed,
resulting from the merger of Boston City Hospital and Boston University Hospital”).
112. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. § 2-3(b) (2013).
113. See
Board Member Profiles, BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N,
http://www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/boardmembers/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited
Oct. 14, 2013) (describing members Paula Johnson, Joseph Betancourt, and Harold
Cox).
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by the mayor only for cause and after a public hearing.114 Members of
the board are unpaid.115 Consistent with other boards of health in the
state, the BPHC possesses the power to promulgate “reasonable
health regulations not inconsistent” with state regulations or law,116
and the Massachusetts courts have similarly interpreted this grant of
authority broadly.117 Given that it is a separate corporate body, it is
questionable whether BPHC regulations can be overruled by the
Boston city council.
Like Boston, Cambridge also has an
independent public health commission that was established by state
statute and that has at times also been a leader in public health
regulation.118

2. New York City
The New York City health agency is a creature of both state law
and the city charter. Per the charter, the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene (DHMH) has and exercises “all powers of a local
health department set forth in law.”119 The Board of Health is part of
DHMH and is its policymaking arm, empowered to add to, amend, or
repeal the city’s health code “for security of life and health in the
city.”120 The mayor appoints the commissioner of the Department,
who must be a doctor of medicine with credentials or experience in
public health,121 and also serves as a member of the Board. The other
ten members of the Board include five members who must be
experienced physicians and five others who must possess experience
and credentials in the sciences.122 All are appointed by the mayor and
serve without pay for six-year terms.123 Whether appointments
require council approval is not mentioned in the city charter, but the

114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. § 2-3(b) (2013).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 2-7(a)(15).
117. See, e.g., RYO Cigar Ass’n v. Bos. Pub. Health Comm’n, 950 N.E.2d 889
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding BPHC’s ban on the sale of cigar wraps).
118. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. §§ 3-1 to 3-21 (2013); see also, e.g., Policy
& Practice, Smoke-free Workplaces, CAMBRIDGE PUB. HEALTH DEP’T,
http://www.cambridgepublichealth.org/policy-practice/policy-advocacy/smoke-freeworkplaces/ (describing how the Cambridge Public Health Department, like the
BPHC, took action to limit smoking in indoor public places before state law did so).
119. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 551.
120. Id. § 558(b).
121. Id. § 551.
122. Id. § 553.
123. Id.
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practice appears to be that the council provides its advice and consent
to nominations.124 Board members can be removed by the mayor due
to “official misconduct,” “negligence,” or other unprofessional
conduct, so long as provided a hearing with counsel if requested.125
Unlike the BPHC, the DHMH and the Board within it are part of the
political subdivision that is the city of New York, and, presumably,
the Board’s changes to the city health code can be overturned or
modified by the city council. Yet, as noted above, the City has argued
in its portion-cap case appeal that the Board exercises plenary
legislative authority directly delegated by the state legislature.126 This
argument implies, although the City has not so asserted directly, that
only the state legislature, and not the city council, has the authority to
overturn Board-adopted rules.

3. Washington: King County-Seattle
One of the more aggressive agencies in enacting public health
regulations, the King County-Seattle Board of Public Health, or King
County Board of Health (KCBOH) is a creature of state law, county
and city code, and county-city agreement.127 The Board consists of
eleven members, ten of whom vote on policy.128 Three are members
of the King County council appointed by that council’s chair; three
are elected officials of Seattle appointed by the city council; and two
are elected officials from other municipalities within King County
appointed by the Sound Cities Association.129 The remaining two

124. See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 6, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 654584/12
(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2013).
125. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 554.
126. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
127. See KING CNTY., WASH., CODE ch. 2.35 (2013); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 3.30.010 (2013) (referring to 1981 agreement between Seattle and King
County regarding health board composition and department funding); WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.05.035 (2013) (allowing home-rule county legislative authorities to
prescribe selection mechanisms for a board of health, but requiring that a majority be
elected officials); id. § 70.08.010 (establishing framework for “Combined City-County
Health Departments”).
128. KING CNTY., WASH., CODE § 2.35.021 (2013).
129. Id. § 2.35.021 (providing that other municipalities agree upon a method of
selection); Membership Roster of the King County Board of Health, KING COUNTY,
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/BOH/members.aspx
[hereinafter,
KING COUNTY] (noting that the Sound Cities Association appoints the “suburban”
members). There are a couple of apparent discrepancies between code and practice.
The King County Code says only that the “city” of Seattle appoints its members,
without indicating whether this is done by the mayor or council, but the KCBOH web
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voting members are “health professionals,” one of whom should have
“knowledge of environmental health, including knowledge of septic
systems and groundwater quality,” each appointed with an
affirmative vote of the prior eight officials totaling at least seven.130 In
calculating votes of the Board, the three county councilmember’s
votes are given double weight, thus creating thirteen total votes.131
All of the elected officials serve terms of just one year, while the
“health professionals” serve three-year terms.132 There is no express
provision for removal from office, and it appears that Board members
are not paid.133 If there were a conflict between a KCBOH rule and
the legislative desires of King County, Seattle, or another King
County city, it is unclear whose rule would trump.
As compared to Boston and New York City, the KCBOH is far
more regional, encompassing numerous municipalities and
unincorporated territory. (Of course, New York City is in a way a
regional government itself, comprising five counties and eight millionplus people, as compared to King County’s two million, so the
comparison is crude.) With respect to institutional independence, the
KCBOH’s members are predominantly drawn from elected bodies of
the county or constituent cities, whereas the BPHC is a separate body
corporate and the New York City Board is appointed directly by the
mayor.134 The KCBOH might be less independent than the BPHC,
but perhaps more independent than the New York City Board
because many of the KCBOH members are officials elected in their
own right, and, therefore, presumably less beholden to any other
elected official.135 Relatedly, insofar as eleven of its thirteen votes are
cast by members holding other elected office, the KCBOH may have

site says the city council makes the appointments. Id. The Code also states that the
county chair appoints county members, KING CNTY., WASH., CODE § 2.35.021.A.1
(2013), but the KCBOH web site says they are appointed by the county council. KING
COUNTY, supra.
130. KING CNTY., WASH., CODE § 2.35.021.A.4 (2013). The final, nonvoting
member is a health professional appointed by a majority vote of the rest of the board.

Id.
131. Id. § 2.35.021.A.1.
132. See KING COUNTY, supra note 129.
133. See KCBOH CODE § 2.04.020(F) (2013), http://www.kingcounty.gov/
healthservices/health/BOH/code.aspx (noting reimbursement only for expenses).
134. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the BPHC and the New York City Board
of Health).
135. For instance, the current membership from Seattle includes city councilors,
including the council president. See KING COUNTY, supra note 129.
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the most democratic legitimacy, or at least political acumen.136 On the
other hand, due to its large number of elected officials, none of whom
need have any expertise in the fields of medicine or public health, the
KCBOH is much less “expert”-dominated than the BPHC or the New
York City Board. Massachusetts towns’ boards are the least
“expert”-dominated, at least by design, requiring no or little specific
credentials or experience for members.137
Before moving on to the more theoretical discussion below, one
more doctrinal note is in order. Essential to the administrative
process’s legitimacy at any level is the extent to which rulemaking is
transparent and involves the public. The details of the various
entities’ rulemaking processes are also determined by an amalgam of
state and local law. New York City, for instance, has its own
administrative procedure act that is codified in the city charter.138 A
full review of local administrative procedure is beyond the scope of
this Article, but the more open and transparent the process, the more
likely the local administrative action will be perceived as legitimate by
the public, the courts, and other elected officials. Standard elements
of process should include the publication of a notice of a public
hearing, at least one hearing at which members of the public and
interested parties may testify, and perhaps some response by the
board to the testimony elicited.139 From anecdotal observations in the
cases discussed above, it appears that the rulemaking process at the
local level may not be as thorough—or at least not as drawn-out—as
the process at the federal level.140

136. The elected officials’ claim to democratic legitimacy is somewhat weakened
by the fact that voters elect these officials to general lawmaking bodies, like the city
council, and not directly to the health board.
137. Only Athol requires one (of three) members to be a “professional health
practitioner.” See ATHOL, MASS., TOWN CHARTER, at § 5-3-9.
138. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER §§ 1041–47 (“City Administrative
Procedure Act”).
139. See, e.g., KING COUNTY, WASH., BOARD OF HEALTH CODE §§ 2.04.140,
2.04.175 (2013) (describing notice-and-comment process for rule adoption).
140. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 31 (2013) (requiring only that a
summary “describ[ing] the substance of any regulation made by a board of health . . .
be published once in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or town, and such
publication shall be notice to all persons”); see also infra note 170.
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III. LOCAL HEALTH A GENCY RULEMAKING AS WILSONIAN
RULEMAKING?
The emerging role of local health agencies as leaders in combating
obesity and tobacco use raises interesting questions for those who
study regulation, administrative law, and policy innovation. This Part
will largely attempt to cabin the question of local innovation
generally, focusing more specifically on the uniqueness of the
innovation that results from local health agencies. This Part thus
begins from the premise that the heightened regulation that has
emerged from the local administrative sphere would not have
occurred absent agency action. In other words, if there were only the
local lawmaking process, some key innovations—such as trans fat
bans, menu labeling, many tobacco restrictions, and a portion cap on
soda—would have never emerged or diffused to the degree that they
have. As is the case at the state and federal levels, agencies are not
perfect agents of elected bodies, and their work does not directly
represent the “will” of the legislature they serve. For example, a
major thrust of the portion-cap litigation is that the New York City
Council did not pass, and never would have passed, the regulation.141
Notably, the Bloomberg administration did not respond to the trial
court ruling by seeking to obtain similar legislation from the city
council. From the public positions taken by many councilors, it
appears that any attempt to do so would have been fruitless.142
If local health agencies are regulating certain powerful industries
like Big Tobacco,143 the food industry, and the soda industry to a
141. N.Y. State Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dept. of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
142. See Id. at 204 (citing a letter submitted to Mayor Bloomberg by fourteen
members of the city council opposing the proposed portion-cap rule); Brief of Amici
Curiae New York City Council Members, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y.
Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 25, 2013) (No. 653584/12) (brief opposing
portion-cap rule submitted on behalf of twenty-three (of fifty-one) council members);
see also Michael M. Grynbaum, In N.A.A.C.P., Soda Industry Finds Ally, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at A20 (noting that “several members of the City Council’s
Black, Latino and Asian Caucus” oppose the rule). Indeed, perhaps in response to
the portion-cap litigation, Mayor Bloomberg has rolled out his more recent proposals
to improve the public health—namely, requiring that retail stores place cigarettes out
of customer view and raising the legal age for buying tobacco to twenty-one—as
legislation before the city council rather than as proposed administrative rules. See
Anemona Hartocollis, City Plan Sets 21 as Legal Age to Buy Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2013, at A1 (discussing both proposals).
143. “Big Tobacco” is a somewhat ambiguous term. For a working definition, see
Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 3 n.2.
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greater degree than local elected officials would regulate on their
own, at least in many prominent instances, what accounts for this
regulatory zeal? And is this heightened regulation justified when put
forward by officials who are less democratically accountable than city
councilors and mayors? In many ways, the challenge to the
Bloomberg soda rule presses these questions to a degree not seen in
the other challenges to local agency authority since the rule is
unpopular with many elected officials, the public at large, and, of
course, the regulated industries. With respect to the regulated
industries, in particular, the record of heightened local regulation
deviates starkly from the public-choice narrative that holds that
administrative agencies are particularly susceptible to undue
influence wielded by well-funded industry interest groups.
A. Public Choice as the “Dominant” Model of Agency
Action, and Other “Contenders”
While not “the only game in town,” public-choice scholarship has
assumed a prominent place in the academic pantheon, particularly as
a means of describing the administrative process, with most accounts
focusing on the federal level.144 Briefly put, public choice rejects the
notion that persons in public positions pursue “the public good,” and
instead assumes that public officials, like all other persons, rationally
pursue their own interests.145 Public choice has traditionally taken an
especially dim view of the administrative process, viewing agency
officials as prone to manipulation by powerful “special interest
groups.”146 Under this account, agency action is far more likely to
benefit special interests than to serve what others might call the
“public good”—the more weakly held preferences of a diffuse
majority.147 More recent and nuanced versions of public choice have
144. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 1 (Daniel A.
Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) [hereinafter, “RESEARCH
HANDBOOK”].
145. See Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and
Rapprochement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 19 (observing that
public choice theory assumes that “political actors—the individuals, groups, and
politico-legal institutions that make public law—act on the basis of rational selfinterest”).
146. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 14–25 (2008) (recounting public
choice’s “cynical” view of administrative regulation).
147. Id.; Mashaw, supra note 145, at 23 (“[P]olicies having widely distributed
benefits and costs will not be adopted even if they would substantially improve
general welfare.”) (citing Michael Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A THEORY OF
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modified this dim portrayal of agency decision-making, but the
conventional public-choice narrative has showed significant staying
power among a large number of academics.148
There are a variety of reasons why the standard public-choice
narrative may be inapplicable in certain local health agency settings.
Borrowing from Steven Croley, the public-choice explanation for
administrative agencies favoring powerful interest groups breaks
down into two arguments. First, agencies can be expected to conform
to legislative preferences regarding regulatory outcomes (which
Croley calls the “legislative dominance” claim of public-choice
theory), and those preferences result from legislators seeking to
obtain interest groups’ help with re-election in exchange for favorable
regulatory treatment (the “legislator motivation” claim).149 Second,
and alternatively, agencies themselves are inclined to favor certain
interest groups, irrespective of legislative influence, due to
pathologies like the “revolving door” of employment between
regulators and the regulated (the “agency favoritism” claim).150
At the local level, the legislator motivation and legislative
dominance claims of public-choice theory may not lead to proindustry outcomes for several reasons. With respect to “legislator
motivation,” city councilors may not be as motivated to protect or
promote the tobacco and food industries as their counterparts are at
higher levels of government. Why local legislators are differently
motivated is a question largely outside the scope of this Article, and
one I have addressed in depth in other work.151 In short, industries
may have less influence on local legislators for at least a couple of key
reasons. The low profile and utter lack of competition in some city
POLITICAL MARKETS (1981)). In this sense, the public-choice account overlaps with
the “capture theory” of the administrative process, although there are distinctions
between the two. “Capture” generally assumes that agencies are unduly influenced
by the large industries they seek to regulate, whereas public-choice theory
acknowledges that any interest group, including but not limited to industry groups,
may exert a strong influence on the regulatory process. Capture also frequently
focuses more on industries obtaining favorable adjudications from agencies, whereas
public-choice more broadly applies to both rulemaking and adjudication. For more
on “capture,” see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1059–67 (1997); Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the
EPA? Appraising Marver Bernstein’s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
148. See Introduction, RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at 5 (noting the
increasing “sophisticat[ion]” and “complex[ity]” of public choice models).
149. See CROLEY, supra note 146, at 44–48.
150. Id. at 48–52.
151. See generally Diller, Innovate, supra note 11.
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legislative elections may make such elections less “price-sensitive,”
and thereby diminish the relative influence of well-funded industry
interest groups on legislators’ motives.152 Further, regulation that
promotes the public health may be closer to the ideological views of
the local legislators’ constituents than they are to the average views of
constituents at higher levels of government.153
Conversely, the interest groups that lobby for public health
measures may have more clout with city councilors than they do with
state legislators and members of Congress. Indeed, public-choice
theory acknowledges that legislator motivations are driven by interest
group pressure, and these interest groups include so-called “public
interest groups” like those that purport to promote the public
health.154 For a public-choice theorist, these groups are no more
virtuous than the soda and tobacco industries. Even on public
choice’s own terms, however, it is difficult to explain why public
health groups would be especially powerful at any level of
government. They contribute comparatively little to campaigns,
spend comparatively little on lobbying, and advocate many proposals
that are unlikely to attract broad public support.155 To be sure, such
groups may be relatively more influential in the local legislative
sphere for a variety of reasons, but that is a long way from explaining
why they have achieved such notable successes in the local
administrative forum.
The second prong of the legislative explanation for administrative
action—the legislative dominance claim—focuses more specifically on
agency innovation. If legislative preferences for public health
regulation are held steady across levels of government (admittedly a
strained assumption), local health agencies might still regulate more
aggressively if city councils are less able to “dominate” agencies than
their legislative counterparts at other levels of government. The
elements of institutional design discussed in Part II likely affect the
degree of dominance a local legislature exercises over its health
agency.
In Boston, for instance, the BPHC is a completely
independent entity not subject to the city council’s direct control.

152. Id. at 40–45.
153. Id. at 46–50.
154. See id. at 39 (noting that the existence of “public interest” groups
“jeopardizes” public choice’s claim that interest groups only pursue their members’
narrow interests).
155. See, e.g., Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 31–33 & n.167 (noting that
industry groups far outspend public health organizations on lobbying).

DILLER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1888

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

11/12/2013 11:14 PM

[Vol. XL

While the council plays a role in determining the board’s membership
by approving mayoral appointees, it appears to lack the power to
overrule BPHC rules, and exercises limited authority over the
Commission’s budget.156 In New York City, the mayor appoints all of
the Board of Health’s members, apparently with the advice and
consent of the council by custom,157 in contrast to the federal model,
in which high-level agency appointments require Senate confirmation
by law.158 Other factors that may influence legislative dominance,
such as the extent to which legislators hold agencies’ feet to the fire
through hearings and other methods, are likely a matter of local
political culture. In short, there may be plausible reasons why some
big city health authorities may be less beholden to the legislature
than, say, federal agencies are to Congress.
It is notable that to the extent that legislative control of health
agencies is weakened in places like Boston and New York City,
executive control is strengthened. Particularly in New York City, the
mayor’s power to appoint all Board members pivots the usual publicchoice inquiry from legislative motivation to executive motivation.
Curiously, many public-choice accounts of agency action focus on
legislators’ interests, but ignore or downplay the degree to which
elected officials are influenced by interest-group pressure.159
Similarly, Steven Croley’s critique of the public-choice narrative for
the federal administrative process emphasizes the importance of
presidential support, but does not explain what motivates the
president to provide such support.160 If the public-choice account is to
have any salience in explaining aggressive public health action by
local agencies, it must explain why mayors like Michael Bloomberg
are motivated to promote the public health at the expense of wellfunded interest groups like the food, soda, and tobacco industries.
There may be plausible explanations. In Bloomberg’s case, his
immense fortune no doubt enables him to pursue goals that are less

156. See MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 111 app. § 2-8(c) (2013) (allowing the mayor to
“approve” or “reject” the BPHC’s proposed budget).
157. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top
Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 924, 926 (2009) (noting that, in 2008, there
were 1141 federal positions requiring Senate confirmation, including all “principal
officers,” as required by the Constitution).
159. See Mashaw, supra note 145, at 36 (noting that “critical actors,” like the
President, are often missing from the public-choice discussion).
160. See CROLEY, supra note 146, at 275–77, 302 (noting the importance of White
House support in protecting agencies’ decisions from Congressional backlash).
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available to other politicians who rely to a much greater extent on
campaign contributions to retain office.161 Freed from such demands,
Bloomberg can pursue goals that are less obviously “rational,” but
that might still fit in the modern public-choice framework, such as
promoting his national profile and enhancing his ego.162 For Boston,
on the other hand, insofar as Mayor Thomas Menino appointed
officials to the BPHC who aggressively promoted public health,
another explanation would be required. Perhaps the explanation lies
in the exceptional longevity of his mayoral tenure.163
As for public choice’s alternative claim of “agency favoritism,”
there may be reasons why local agencies are less hospitable to the
food, soda, and tobacco industries than higher-level agencies. Local
agencies may be more removed from the “revolving door” culture of
lobbyists, lawyer, and think tanks that some commentators accuse of
poisoning agency work at the federal level.164 The requirement of
expertise for at least some members of the policymaking boards of
local health agencies may minimize the degree to which political
“hacks” influence the rulemaking process.165 Agency culture may also
play a role. Indeed, consistent with public choice’s premise that all
persons, including those who serve in regulatory roles, promote their
own self-interest, there is a longstanding, if now somewhat
discredited, public-choice account for heightened regulation.
Administrators might prefer enhanced regulation, the story goes,

161. Forbes, for instance, estimates Bloomberg’s net worth to be $31 billion as of
October 2013. The World’s Billionaires, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/
michael-bloomberg/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
162. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of
the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 309, 320–24 (2002) (discussing the “deep ambivalence within public choice
scholarship about whether the interests that constitute self-interest . . . are limited to
material matters, or whether they extend to such discarnate concerns as power,
prestige, and leisure”).
163. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Beloved but Ill, Boston Mayor Won’t
Run Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, at A11 (noting that upon the end of his final
term, Menino will have been Boston’s mayor for twenty straight years).
164. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507, 510 & n.13, 512–16 (recounting the “revolving door indictment” against
agencies popular in academic literature, including among public choice scholars).
165. Requiring agency members to have certain professional qualifications,
however, is not unique to the local level. See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS app. (2008)
(listing numerous examples of high-ranking federal agency appointments that require
specific qualifications by statute).
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because it increases their power and budgets.166 The sum of this tour
de public choice is that for those who embrace its descriptive power,
there is much work to be done to explain why certain local agencies
have been at the forefront of public health regulation. Public-choice
tools might help explain why local agencies have been more
aggressive than their higher-level counterparts, but clearly, the
standard public-choice narrative, with its gloomy description of
agencies hemmed in by powerful industry groups, is a weaker
affirmative explanation for the regulatory record of many local public
health agencies.
While public choice is perhaps the most prominent academic
account of agency action, there are other “contenders” that I will
address briefly here. A strong strain of local government scholarship
roots itself in the civic republican tradition;167 likewise, some
administrative law scholars have turned to civic republicanism as a
justification for the administrative state.168 There is a potential
overlap, therefore, in these two accounts, focusing on the local
administrative forum. For reasons explained elsewhere, I am a
skeptic of the civic republican (or its conceptual sibling, the
communitarian) argument for local innovation generally.169 Big-city
innovations like the portion-cap rule only bolster this skepticism for a
couple of reasons. First, the amount of public “deliberation” before
and during these policies’ adoption was minimal.170 Second, the fact
166. See Mashaw, supra note 145, at 36 (recounting William Niskanen’s claim of
“budget maximization,” and the ensuing criticism thereof). For more on this claim,
see infra note 183).
167. See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and
Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
137, 152–57 (2008) (making normative argument for a civic republican model of local
government).
168. The seminal piece here is Mark Seidenfeld’s A Civic Republican Justification
for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
169. See Diller, Innovate, supra note 11, at 44–45. For criticism of the civic
republican account in the administrative context, see CROLEY, supra note 146, at 62–
65 (faulting the civic republican narrative for being “vague with respect to exactly
who participates [in administrative decision-making] and what their behavioral
motivations are”).
170. See, e.g., N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013), aff’d, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (noting that
the rule was proposed on June 12, 2012, with public comments due in writing or at a
hearing held on July 24, 2012); Michael M. Grynbaum, Strong Words from Both
Sides at a Hearing on Bloomberg’s Soda Ban, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, at A19
(observing that “few of the dozens of speakers who turned out at [the] hearing . . .
represented the average soda-drinker on the street,” and identifying, “more or less,”
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that New York City, whose population of eight million-plus exceeds
that of all but eleven states, has been at the forefront of such
innovation in the administrative sphere complicates the civic
republican account, given that the Big Apple is hardly the New
England township of Tocquevillian lore so romanticized by
communitarians.171 Perhaps civic republicans would have better luck
explaining some of the innovations adopted by health boards in small
Massachusetts towns like Athol, Barnstable, and Yarmouth.
The other account for agency action generally that is worth noting
as a contrast to the public-choice school is Steven Croley’s forceful
argument that administrators are capable of regulating for the public
good. Croley argues that the arduous processes federal law requires
of administrative action, combined with rigorous executive and
judicial review, can provide the right setting for rules that serve the
public good.172 As a rebuttal of the public-choice school as applied to
any level of government, Croley’s work is most valuable. As an
affirmative account for local administrative rulemaking, however,
Croley’s account, which focuses solely on the federal administrative
system, is less helpful. Because Croley focuses on the rigorous
process for regulating at the federal level, his argument has less
salience at the local level where the procedural requirements may be
less robust.173 Further, and more fundamentally, much of what Croley
likes about the federal administrative process is that it involves the
public and, ultimately, can promulgate rules that the public
supports.174 As a defense of local administrative action like New York
City’s portion-cap rule, Croley’s account falters, since the rule lacks
public support.175 While the portion-cap rule may be the starkest
example of an unpopular agency rule, others, like the trans fat ban,
met some degree of public skepticism before ultimately gaining

those testifying against the rule as representatives of either the soda industry or its
affiliates and those testifying in favor of the rule as academics and health
professionals).
171. See New York (City), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (estimating the 2012
population of New York City to be 8,336,697).
172. See generally CROLEY, supra note 146.
173. See, e.g., supra note 170.
174. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 146, at 256 (noting that various examples of
“socially beneficial regulation” “enjoyed public acceptance, or at least generated no
public opposition”).
175. See Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda
Ban, Calling it an Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012,
at A19.
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acceptance.176 To defend at least some of the rules that local health
agencies have issued, particularly in the realm of obesity prevention,
one needs a justification that depends less on popular opinion. For
that more expert-based—and perhaps elitist—account, this paper now
turns to Woodrow Wilson.
B. The Wilsonian Administrative State
Writing as a political scientist, before he would achieve far more
notoriety as governor of New Jersey and then President of the United
States, Woodrow Wilson made the case for the “scientific”
administration of government.177
Rooted in the Progressive
movement’s push for civil service reform, Wilson believed that
scientific administration by trained experts who did not owe their
appointment to politicians would make government more efficient
and businesslike, and therefore more able to serve the public good.178
By “scientific,” Wilson did not mean a government administered by
physicists and biologists, but rather that the administration of
government be treated like a science (as political science had been
before it) and then staffed by those trained in its methods.179 Wilson’s
argument was in some ways a call for the establishment of schools
dedicated to training public administrators that are now common in
universities, but were unheard-of at the time.180 Wilson looked to
176. While I was unable to find a poll testing public reaction to the trans fat ban in
New York City or any other jurisdiction, the media commentary regarding proposed
bans was often quite negative, in New York City and elsewhere. E.g., John Tierney,
One Cook Too Many, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A15 (“This is the biggest step yet
in turning the Big Apple into the Big Nanny.”); see also Brittany Schaeffer, No Fries
for You!, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Oct. 25, 2006, http://www.wweek.com/portland/article6206-no_fries_for_you_.html (noting “[f]ears of overzealous government regulation”
and warning readers, disingenuously, to “[e]at your doughnuts while you still can” as
Multnomah County, Ore., considered adopting a trans fat ban). But see Roni Caryn
Rabin, Calorie Labels May Clarify Options, Not Actions, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/17/health/nutrition/17cons.html?pagewanted=print
(citing a 2005 poll finding that eighty-three percent of consumers wanted nutritional
information in restaurants, which the author took as overwhelming support for menu
labeling).
177. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, in WOODROW WILSON:
THE ESSENTIAL POLITICAL WRITINGS 231, 234 (Ronald J. Pestritto ed., 2005)
(“[T]here should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the
paths of government . . . .”).
178. See id. at 231–34.
179. See id. at 232–34, 240.
180. See, e.g., About WWS: History, PRINCETON UNIV. WOODROW WILSON SCH.
OF PUB. & INT’L AFFAIRS, http://wws.princeton.edu/about_wws/history/ (last visited
Oct. 14, 2013) (noting that the school was created in 1930 “in the spirit of Woodrow
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Continental Europe as an inspiration for scientific governmental
administration, but was sensitive to the challenge of importing its
model to the American democratic system.181 To that end, Wilson
acknowledged a role for politics and public opinion to supervise
governmental decisions at an abstract level, but urged that
administrators be given broad discretion to implement these plans as
they saw fit.182 Wilson is now considered the leading early advocate of
the modern American administrative state, even if his vision of an
apolitical civil service promoting the public good had more classical
antecedents,183 and is frequently derided by contemporary scholars as
naïve.184
Other prominent social scientists of the early twentieth century like
Frank Goodnow and Max Weber reinforced Wilson’s vision of a
“more rational, less political government” in their writings.185 Their
views were further refined during the New Deal by defenders of the
rapidly expanding administrative state like James Landis. Landis
argued that specialized agencies were well-positioned to enact better
policy, and less likely to be influenced by “impertinent
considerations” (like politics) when doing so.186 To some extent,
Kenneth Culp Davis carried on the intellectual torch from Wilson and
Landis, defending broad delegations to agencies as necessary given

Wilson’s interest in preparing students for leadership in public and international
affairs”).
181. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 235–37 (discussing administration in France
and Prussia).
182. See id. at 243 (discussing the “proper relations between public opinion and
administration”).
183. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 193 (1971) (noting that the view that “honest men insulated from
political and economic pressure will act in the public interest . . . derives from
Confucius and Plato and has dominated the modern literature on public
administration since Woodrow Wilson”).
184. E.g., id.; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99 & n.12 (2000) (citing Wilson as “[t]he most
famous American advocate of an apolitical scientific administration,” which “naively
assumed away political influence in the administrative process”).
185. David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 405 & nn.18–19 (2002) (citing works of Goodnow and Weber).
186. Id. at 405 & nn.21–23 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938)); see also Merrill, supra note 147, at 1056 (citing Landis as “the most
obvious example” of a “neo-progressive[] who thought that the answer to interest
group influence was to insulate expert administrative agencies from ordinary
politics”).
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Congress’s inability to grapple with minute details and complex
scientific questions better left to experts in the relevant field.187
Although the Wilsonian vision of administrative agencies has lived
on to some extent, public choice has largely eclipsed it in the
academic world. For public-choice scholars, the “early Progressives”
like Wilson “merely succeeded in transferring political bargaining
from the legislative arena . . . to the administrative arena.”188 Because
public choice rejects the notion of any individual pursuing the public
good—or even the notion of a public good outright—the idea that an
agency might remain apolitical, much less that an apolitical agency
will create better policy, is utterly fanciful. As a partial heir to the
Wilsonian school, Steven Croley rejects the public-choice account and
offers his more process-based argument for the administrative state.189
Croley, however, believes that the administrative process will result in
rules that enjoy public support. Croley, therefore, hopes that the
administrative process will achieve the political success that Wilson so
deliberately eschewed, and in that respect departs from Wilson’s
emphasis on scientific, technocratic rulemaking.
C. The New York City Portion-Cap Rule as Wilsonian
Rulemaking?
For supporters of local public health regulation, the Wilsonian
vision of administrative rulemaking offers a compelling narrative for
the kind of innovation that has occurred at the local level. In this
regard, the New York City portion-cap rule stands out as perhaps the
archetypal example of Wilsonian rulemaking on the local level. The
rule is “scientific,” beneficial to the public health, and almost
certainly would not have emerged from the ordinary political process.
Legions of empirical data demonstrate that individual consumption
patterns are influenced by serving sizes.190 Substantial empirical study

187. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 26 (1982) (citing Davis as an “adhere[nt]” of “a Wilsonian view of
administrative government”) (citing 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.15, at 206–07 (2d ed. 1978)); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 12–13 (3d ed. 1972) (arguing that a legislative body is
“ill suited for . . . applying to shifting and continuing problems the ideas supplied by
scientists or other professional advisers”).
188. Aranson et al., supra note 187, at 26.
189. See supra notes 172–72 and accompanying text.
190. See generally, Nicole Diliberti et al., Increased Portion Size Leads to
Increased Energy Intake in a Restaurant Meal, 12 OBESITY RES. 562 (2004); Lisa R.
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shows that increased consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages,
influenced in part by the “super-sizing” of soda and other sugar-rich,
nutrient-poor beverages, has contributed to the meteoric rise in
obesity in the United States over the last thirty years, as well as to
other health problems like coronary disease and dental caries.191 It is
reasonable, therefore, for health experts to conclude that mandated
decreases in portion sizes, even if avoidable with additional effort,
might decrease the consumption of obesogenic beverages, and
thereby make a dent in the obesity rate in New York City and
beyond.192
Despite the public health-based argument for limiting portion sizes,
the rule is one that the political system at any level of government is
unlikely to adopt. The rule was immediately unpopular with the New
York City public and many public officials, attracting significant
mockery from the popular media and commentators.193 Perhaps more
importantly, the rule aroused the ire of—by threatening
economically—not just the powerful soda industry, but also its allies
(on this issue, at least) like the fast-food industry, other retailers, and

Young, The Contribution of Expanding Portion Sizes to the US Obesity Epidemic,
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 246 (2002).
191. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN OBESITY PREVENTION:
SOLVING THE WEIGHT OF THE NATION 167 (Dan Glickman et al. eds., 2012)
(identifying sugary drinks as “the single largest contributor of calories and added
sugars to the American diet”); K.E. Heller et al., Sugared Soda Consumption and
Dental Caries in the United States, 80 J. DENTAL RES. 1949 (2001) (finding
significant associations between soda consumption and decayed, missing, or filled
surfaces of teeth for persons over twenty-five years of age); Vasanti S. Malik et al.,
Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review, 84
AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 274 (2006) (“The weight of epidemiologic and
experimental evidence indicates that a greater consumption of SSBs is associated
with weight gain and obesity.”); Gail Woodward-Lopez et al., To What Extent Have
Sweetened Beverages Contributed to the Obesity Epidemic?, 14 PUB. HEALTH
NUTRITION 499 (2010) (concluding that sweetened beverage intake “has made a
substantive contribution to the obesity epidemic experienced in the USA in recent
decades”).
192. See N.Y.C DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE
OF AN ADOPTION OF AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.53) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK
CITY HEALTH CODE (2012) available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/
pdf/notice/2012/notice-adoption-amend-article81.pdf.
193. See, e.g., Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 175 (reporting that sixty percent
of New York City residents opposed the rule); The Daily Show with Jon Stewart:
Drink Different (Comedy Central broadcast May 31, 2012), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-may-31-2012/drink-different (mocking the
rule).
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unions.194 Politically influential groups like the NAACP,195 which
receives significant financial support from the soda industry, also
publicly opposed the rule.196 Industry groups immediately spent over
a million dollars advertising against the rule even before the Board of
Health approved it, hoping to shape and solidify public dislike of the
rule.197
While super-rich, term-limited Mayor Bloomberg was
impervious to the industry’s assault, one wonders whether a majority
of city councilors, had the council enacted such a policy by ordinance,
would have withstood such a barrage.198 On the other hand, as
unpaid, appointed volunteers, many of whom have public health and
medical credentials, the Board’s members were probably less likely to
waver than city councilors in the wake of industry and public
opposition. For all of these reasons, the Board’s rule seemed to fit
the mold of Wilsonian rulemaking even if the portion cap’s impact on
public health was empirically indeterminate at the time of the rule’s
adoption.199
194. See, e.g., Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 175 (noting that the American
Beverage Association’s members stood to lose millions from the implementation of
the rule and launched a “big-budget public-relations effort” to oppose it).
195. The New York State Conference of the NAACP filed an amicus brief
opposing the portion-cap rule, see Brief of Amici Curiae N.Y. State Conf. of NAACP
et al. at 1, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05505 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 25,
2013) (No, 653584/12), and the national president of the NAACP, Benjamin Jealous,
publicly opposed the rule as well, Sal Gentile & Allison Koch, NAACP President
Comes Out Against Blocked NYC Soda Ban, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 16, 2013),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/51207127/t/naacp-president-comes-out-against-blockednyc-soda-ban/#.Ud3p5234Jvo.
196. See Grynbaum, supra note 142 (describing the NAACP’s “close ties to big
soft-drink companies, particularly Coca-Cola,” which donated “tens of thousands of
dollars” to an NAACP health education program).
197. Michael M. Grynbaum, In Soda Fight, Industry Focuses on the Long Run,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A28 (citing example of “New Yorkers for Beverage
Choices,” a soda industry-sponsored group, that “spent more than $1 million on a
public-relations campaign against” the rule before implementation).
198. By way of comparison, the San Francisco city council held firm after enacting
an ordinance restricting toy giveaways with children’s meals of low nutritional quality
(often imprecisely and pejoratively referred to as a “Happy Meal ban”), San
Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 290-10 (codified at SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HEALTH
CODE §§ 471.1-471.9), despite significant media ridicule of the regulation. See The
Daily Show with Jon Stewart: San Francisco’s Happy Meal Ban (Comedy Central
broadcast Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/monjanuary-3-2011/san-francisco-s-happy-meal-ban (mocking the ordinance in an
interview with San Francisco City Supervisor Eric Mar).
199. Indeed, an empirical study released after the portion-cap rule’s aborted
implementation purports to demonstrate that the rule would not have reduced
consumption, because consumers would instead buy bundles of servings that exceed
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In other ways, however, the Board’s promulgation of the portioncap rule fell short of the Wilsonian ideal. As stressed by the rule’s
opponents, the Board of Health did not independently conjure up the
rule. Rather, Mayor Bloomberg’s office proposed the rule, which the
Board then adopted verbatim, thus undercutting the Wilsonian
argument for deference to the Board’s scientific expertise.200 That the
mayor appoints all of the Board’s members likely further weakened
any claim by the Board to being an apolitical body focused on
scientific solutions. Combined with the Board’s apparent lack of
deliberation regarding the mayor’s proposal, the New York judiciary
has thus far adjudged the rule as much an executive power-grab as an
attempt to regulate for the public health of New Yorkers.
The mere fact that an agency board collaborates with an elected
official, even one who appoints its members, should not ipso facto
nullify the legitimacy of the resultant rule. After all, the members of
the New York City Board possess a broad degree of expertise in the
fields of medicine or health.201 Presumably they played at least a
screening function in approving Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal.
Moreover, requiring every local health agency to demonstrate that it
thought of every rule on its own would impose a needless burden on
local rulemaking. It would also limit policy diffusion by preventing
local health agencies from borrowing other jurisdictions’ innovations
without re-inventing the regulatory wheel. Indeed, any flaws in the
New York City Board’s rulemaking process from a Wilsonian
perspective do not necessarily justify judicial invalidation of the
portion-cap rule. They simply demonstrate that, to lay better claim to
the Wilsonian mantle, more agency independence in design and
practice would be helpful. In this regard, the BPHC’s status as a

the rule’s portion cap. See Brent M. Wilson et al., Regulating the Way to Obesity:
Unintended Consequences of Limiting Sugary Drink Sizes, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2013,
at 2. The study, however, measured only the amount of beverage purchased rather
than consumed, and assumes that consumers will be offered bundled servings in a
convenient fashion. See id.
200. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(noting that Mayor Bloomberg initially announced the portion-cap rule); id. at 213
(“[T]he rule was drafted, written and proposed by the Office of the Mayor and
submitted to the Board, which enacted it without any substantive changes.”).
201. See supra notes 121 and 122 and accompanying text; see also Brief for
Respondents-Appellants at 6–7, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05505
(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2013) (No. 654584/12) (listing the impressive professional
credentials of the Board’s members).
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separate body corporate, along with the clear requirement of city
council confirmation of its members, may be preferable.
The New York Statewide Coalition court also faulted the Board’s
portion-cap rule for not being Wilsonian enough in a different way.
In holding that the rule amounted to unconstitutional legislation as
opposed to permissible interstitial administrative rulemaking, the
Appellate Division asked whether the agency acted “solely” within its
area of expertise.202 Under the Court of Appeals precedent of Boreali
v. Axelrod, whether an agency considers “political, social, and
economic” concerns outside of its “technical” area of expertise is a
“circumstance” indicating potential usurpation of the legislative
role.203 In applying this Boreali “factor,” the Appellate Division
faulted the Board for various inconsistencies in the portion-cap
rule.204 The rule, for instance, did not apply to alcoholic beverages
and certain milk, fruit, and coffee drinks.205 The rule also applied only
to some retail establishments, like restaurants, movie theaters, and
stadiums, but not to others, like grocery and convenience stores.206
The City claimed that the rule exempted grocery and convenience
stores because the state’s Department of Agriculture, rather than the
City’s Board of Health, has jurisdiction to regulate them.207 To the
Appellate Division, however, the exceptions based on practical and
jurisdictional concerns indicated that the Board unduly balanced
social and economic considerations in promulgating the rule.208 In a
similar vein, the trial court held that these various exceptions
rendered the rule “arbitrary and capricious.”209
Whatever the doctrinal garb, faulting the Board as a legal matter
for considering practical concerns in promulgating the portion-cap
rule is misguided. If, by requiring agencies to operate only within
their areas of expertise, it reflects an embrace of Wilsonian
202. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 212–13.
203. 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1351, 1355 (N.Y. 1987).
204. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 207 (referring to Boreali’s selfdescribed “circumstances” as “factors”).
205. Id. at 205.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 209–10.
208. Id. at 210 (“[T]he selective restrictions enacted by the Board . . . reveal that
the health of the residents of New York City was not its sole concern.”).
209. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584-2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 11, 2013) (“[The rule] is arbitrary and capricious because it applies to some but
not all food establishments in the City [and] excludes other beverages that have
significantly higher concentrations of sugar sweeteners . . . .”).
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rulemaking, it is an unworkable hyper-Wilsonianism. Wilson wanted
agencies to be more “scientific” than the political branches, but he did
not expect them to be completely immune to practical and political
considerations.210
That they might consider social, economic,
jurisdictional, and political implications in tempering the scope of
their rules is not inconsistent with his vision. The Appellate
Division’s approach, by contrast, requires that agencies willfully
ignore real-world concerns like a rule’s public acceptance or practical
enforceability. As the dissent in Boreali pointed out, such a view of
the agency rulemaking process is simply unworkable.211 Moreover,
faulting the rule for its exceptions is inconsistent with the widely
accepted notion that the government may attempt to regulate away a
problem in piecemeal fashion.212 The judicial decisions in the portioncap litigation thus far are the distasteful fruit of Boreali’s tree of
reasoning.213 For the portion-cap rule to be upheld, the New York
Court of Appeals may have to reconsider this curious precedent.
In addition to the legal challenge to the portion-cap rule, the rule
has been subject to a ferocious “cultural attack” by the popular press,
political commentators, and comedians of varied political stripes.
The New York Post referred to Michael Bloomberg as the “Soda
Jerk”;214 Jon Stewart, Bill Maher, and Glenn Beck all railed against
the portion cap;215 and even the venerable New York Times
applauded the trial court’s decision invalidating the rule.216 In
210. See Wilson, supra note 177, at 243 (contending that “public opinion” is
“indispensable” and should play the role of “authoritative critic” in “superintending”
administration).
211. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1359–60 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority opinion for requiring the agency to “pristinely premise[]” its
rule on public health concerns, as “[l]ife and government are not so neatly
categorized”).
212. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (rejecting federal
equal protection challenge to government regulation where regulation takes “one
step at a time,” and noting that “[t]he legislature may select one phase of one field
and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others”).
213. See also supra notes 82–100 and accompanying text (discussing Boreali’s
influence on New York Statewide Coalition).
214. Soda Jerk!, N.Y. POST, Feb. 24, 2013, at 1.
215. Worst Mayor Ever: Bloomberg’s Soda Ban Passes 9-0, GLENN BECK (Sept.
13, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://www.glennbeck.com/2012/09/13/worst-mayor-everbloomberg%E2%80%99s-soda-ban-passes-9-0/; Real Time with Bill Maher (HBO
Broadcast Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/
03/16/maher_bloombergs_ban_on_sodas_makes_liberals_look_bad.html; The Daily
Show, supra note 184.
216. Editorial, Mayor Bloomberg’s Anti-Obesity Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2013, at A24.
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criticizing the rule, much of the invective focused on Mayor
Bloomberg himself, demonstrating that for the public, the rule was
hardly seen as the work of an independent body of experts, but rather
the brainchild of a politician who has become particularly well-known
for public health crusades. Moreover, the rule tapped into a deep
vein of resentment of any governmental intrusion on perceived
“freedom to choose” what and how much to eat and drink.217 Much
of the public clearly either does not understand or does not agree
with the scientific findings that “choice” is very much determined by a
consumer’s environment.218 Indeed, the Appellate Division faulted
the Board for even considering behavioral economics in promulgating
the rule.219 For the obesity prevention movement to succeed, it will
need to work much harder on educating the public in this regard.
With respect to a restriction on food or beverage choice that is
perceived as more tangible than, say, the trans fat ban (which did not
ban any particular food or quantity of food, but just a particular
ingredient), the American public appears less willing to defer to
scientific experts.
CONCLUSION
While they may be awkward doctrinal creatures, local public health
agencies are increasingly at the vanguard of regulatory strategies to
curb tobacco use and obesity. In a handful of states, their broad
powers have allowed them to do as much, if not more, than elected
local officials in that regard. Should courts and elected officials trust
these unelected—yet sometimes expert—agencies’ judgments even
when unpopular? Hopefully, the answer is at least a qualified yes, not
simply because there may be some normative merit to the Wilsonian
vision of administrative rulemaking, but because local agencies’
actions have destabilized and reshaped public opinion over time. For
instance, while public opinion in New York and elsewhere may have

217. For an interesting discussion of whether the federal Constitution protects such
choices, see Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 738 (2013)
(concluding that there is no such constitutional protection generally).
218. See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America,
53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1698–99 (2004); Paul A. Diller, Combating Obesity with a Right
to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 985–86 (2013).
219. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (“[T]he
Board’s decision effectively relies upon the behavioral economics concept that
consumers are pushed into better behavior when certain choices are made less
convenient.”).
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been cool to the trans fat ban initially,220 this regulation is now taken
in stride and appears to have succeeded at lowering the health risks
associated with eating fast food.221 Similarly, while the portion-cap
rule may have been a shock initially, New Yorkers—and others—
might warm to the idea eventually if it is allowed to proceed and is
implemented smoothly. Depriving agencies of the ability to get out in
front of public opinion would remove, at least in the public health
sphere, a significant weapon from the arsenal of government action,
particularly when the regulated industries wield significance influence
over elected officials at higher levels of government through
campaign contributions and lobbying. As public-choice theorists
would readily acknowledge, “democracy” is easily throttled by
entrenched defenders of the regulatory status quo. Sometimes elite
experts, more insulated from the rough-and-tumble of politics, are the
persons most capable of breaking that status quo. Their work will
stake a better claim to legitimacy when their independence and
expertise are less impeachable, and the public perceives their
rulemaking as more than the rubber-stamping of an elected
politician’s policy idea.

220. See supra note 176.
221. See Sonia Y. Angell et al., Change in Trans Fatty Acid Content of Fast-Food
Purchases Associated with New York City’s Restaurant Regulation, 157 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 81 (2012).

